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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INSURANCE AND .ANNUITY COMBINA-
TIONS-Decedent, aged seventy-six, invested in three single premium life 
insurance policies. Issuance of each was conditioned on the purchase of 
a single life, nonrefundable annuity of specified value, and no physical 
examination was required. Each combination was balanced so that the 
total premium, exclusive of loading charges, equalled the face value of 
the insurance. The resulting correlation between compound interest and 
annuity disbursements made the guaranteed payments to the annuitant 
correspond precisely with the expected income of a reinvestment of the 
entire deposit by the insurer.1 Decedent retained the annuity rights, but 
all present an_d future interests in the life policies were transferred to her 
children and the plaintiff-executor eight years prior to her death.2 The 
Commissioner contended that the insurance proceeds were subject to an 
estate tax under I.R.C., section 2036, which includes in the gross estate 
the value of any property of which decedent has at any time made a transfer 
for less than a full and adequate consideration "under which he has re-
tained for life . . • (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to in-
come from, the property .... "3 This contention was rejected by the dis-
trict court4 but accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.5 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three 
justices dissenting. Although each combination was the product of a 
single, integrated transaction, · the contracts were from the time of is-
suance separate and distinct and decedent could not, therefore, be said to 
have retained a life interest in the transferred property. Fidelity-Philadel-
phia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958). 
Essentially,_ the basic question in the case was what constituted the 
"property" which decedent transferred to the donees. Because of the 
actuarial relationship, the government took the position that each policy 
of life insurance with its corresponding annuity made one indivisible in-
vestment. The company's agreement would thus be viewed as being 
to return the principal sum at death with interest payable to decedent 
in the meantime, the gift to the insurance beneficiary consisting of a 
remainder interest only. Such an approach has been accepted by a 
:! For a detailed explanation of the actuarial concepts involved, see Commissioner 
v. Keller's .Estate, (3d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 833. 
2 Decedent's children were named primary beneficiaries and the plaintiff-executor 
contingent beneficiary to take under trust the share of any child that might pre-decease 
the insured. Two of the policies appear to confer the right of cash surrender on the 
children directly and not in their capacities as beneficiaries. That right in the third 
policy was eventually transferred to the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement making the 
aforesaid trust thereafter unalterable and irrevocable. 
3 I.R.C. (1939), §811(c)(l)(B), as amended 63 Stat. 894, §7(a) (1949), involved in the 
principal case, was reinacted -unchanged as I.R.C. (1954), §2036. 
4 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, (E.D. Pa. 1956) 142 F. Supp. 561. 
5 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, (3d Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 690. 
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majority of courts passing on this type of arrangement.6 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court previously has decided that the life insurance proceeds 
in this context are not to be considered "insurance" for estate tax pur-
poses, 7 a result which now appears settled8 and which is explainable only 
if the •two contracts are considered an entity. But in the principal case 
the Court concluded that each policy is a separate item of property, stress-
ing that the annuity could have been acquired alone, that it would have 
continued unimpaired had the life policy been extinguished, and that 
either could have been separately assigned.9 The result appears to have 
been reached primarily because the contracts, after issuance, had a form-
ally independent existence. The Court has often stated, however, that 
it will look to substance rather than form or legal niceties in matters of 
taxation.10 In view of this and of the fact that both the petitioner's and 
government's arguments are logically sound, it would seem more satis-
factory to approach the basic question by also considering whether -the 
economic realities and statutory purpose decree that the contracts should 
be thought of as indivisible. In an analogous series of cases the decedent 
made in substance a complete and irrevocable -transfer of property in return 
for a contractual promise of certain payments for the remainder of his 
life. The transferred property generally has been held to be free of any 
estate tax liability on grounds that the donor could not be said to have 
retained any possessory interest or enjoyment therein.11 Similarly, trans-
6 Burr v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 871; Conway v. Glenn, (6th Cir. 
1952) 193 F. (2d) 965; Estate of Reynolds, 45 B.T .A. 44 (1941). Contra, Bohnen v. Harrison, 
(7th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 492, affd. per curiam 345 U.S. 946 (1953), by an equally divided 
Court. The tax court has held that an actual surrender by the donee prior to the trans-
feror's death would avoid the tax. Estate of Hutchinson, 20 T.C. 749 (1953). Reasoning 
from substance, however, it is difficult to see why this event, which has no effect either 
on decedent or her estate, should reverse the outcome. 
7 Commissioner v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). The Court there said, at 539 to 541, 
that to constitute insurance, "the amounts must be received as the result of a transaction 
which involved an actual 'insurance risk' at the time the transaction was executed ...• 
We cannot find such an insurance risk in the contracts ...• The .•. annuity and 
the insurance are opposites; in this combination the one neutralizes the risk customarily 
inherent in the other." In LeGierse there had been no assignment of the insurance 
rights, but this factor does not appear to be significant. "The principle that the proceeds 
are not considered 'receivable . . . as insurance' applies whether at death the rights 
and benefits of the policies are in the hands of the insured or another person." Prin-
cipal case at 278, note 3. It is clear that as the purpose and result of the interrelationship 
of the contracts is to avoid incurring any insurance risk, the combined premium in this 
sense is looked upon by the company as an aggregate sum. 
s It nevertheless seems arguable that for income tax purposes the proceeds should 
be considered "insurance" in the hands of the ·beneficiary. The Court has yet to pass 
directly on this question. 
9 Principal case at 280. 
10 E.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940). 
11 E.g., Welch v. Hall, (1st Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 366; Hirsh v. United States, (Ct. 
CI. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 982. These and similar decisions are often referred to as "private 
annuity" cases. See generally, Surrey and Aronson, "Inter Vivos Transfers and the Fed-
eral Estate Tax," 32 CoL. L. REv. 1332 (1932). 
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£erred property ·has not been taxed merely because the donor later made 
use of, or received benefits from it at the sufferance of the donee. The 
rationale has been that the statutory language requires such results.12 
_Standing alone, however, such an argument is not persuasive since in the 
area of taxation the courts have never been adverse to treating one situa-
tion "as if' it were another when they are convinced this is warranted.13 
Nevertheless, where the_ contract liability neither restricts nor is de-
pendent upon the donee's use or enjoyment of the gift res, the result 
that has been reached appears desirable because the interest of the donor 
does not remain, after the transaction, directly related to that which he has 
given away; rather, his interest and that of the transferee are independent 
of one another. On the other hand, in cases involving joint and survivor 
annuities, where the basic question is identical with that in the principal 
case, the contract has been held taxable as akin to a trust in which an 
annual sum is reserved by, the settlor to be paid from income and corpus 
with remainder over.14 The Court in . the instant case distinguishes these 
cases on the grounds that if the donor's annuity is extinguished the donee's 
interest is destroyed, and that beneficial enjoyment by the donee is depend-
ent upon and must aV{ait the death of the donor.15 The first argument is not 
persuasive.16 But in terms of economic realities the Court would seem 
justified in drawing a distinction between cases in which the donee could 
presently obtain possessory enjoyment and those in which he could not. 
The former situation, in which the donor's death is of formal signifi-
cance only and where all essential incidents of ownership are vested in 
the donee, conceivably should result· in no estate taxation. The opinions, 
however, have not stressed this factor as determinative either in the 
insurance-annuity cases or in cases involving analogous problems. Indeed, 
12 See Gardner v. Delaney, (D.C. Mass. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 610 at 616. Compare 
generally, Peek v. United States, (E.D. Pa. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 826. 
13 It has· been suggested that this approach be taken if the "annuity" closely ap-
proximates the expected income from the property transferred. Surrey and Aronson, 
"Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax," 32 CoL. L. REV. 1332 (1932). However 
in a case where decedent gave to his wife a gift equal in amount to the purchase price 
of an insurance contract on his life, and himself bought an annuity so she could obtain 
such ·a contract, the death proceeds were held to be not includible in his estate. Estate 
of Dundore, P-H 1942 T.C. -Mem. Dec. lf42,028. 
14 E.g., Commissioner v. Clise, (9th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 998; Forster v. Sauber, 
(7th Cir. 1957) 249 F. (2d) 379. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1939) 
102 F. (2d) 380. Where purchase of the annuity has been by decedent's employer, however, 
the result has been otherwise. Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate; (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. 
(2d) 627; Higgs' Estate v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 427. These latter cases 
appear to be in basic conflict with the former group, treating the original contract 
as in reality two separate annuities, a present one for the first annuitant and a deferred 
one for the survivor. Joint and survivor annuities are now specifically treated in I.R.C., 
§2039. 
15 Principal case at 279, note 5. 
16 The contract involved is often irrevocable and thus the question of extinguishment 
is not material. E.g., Commissioner v. Clise, note 14 supra. 
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the Supreme Court expressly rejected it in interpreting section 811 (c) 
(I) (C) of the 1939 code,11 and it remains to be seen whether it will be in-
corporated as a limitation on the principal decision. Further, desirable ·as 
this distinction may be, it is a difficult one to arrive at through any analysis 
of section 2036 itself since it necessarily involves as a point of reference the 
point of the transferee. In the comparatively early case of May v. Heiner,18 
the Court held an irrevocable trust with life interest retained not to be sub-
ject to an estate tax under the "take effect at death" clause. What is now 
section 2036 was Congress' answer to this decision and appears to have been 
specifically aimed at including in the taxable estate transfers where actual 
possession is postponed until death though title vests indefeasibly in the 
donee at an earlier date.19 In view of this objective it should be arguable 
that if decedent in the instant case gave the rights of cash surrender to the 
donees other than as beneficiaries,20 the situation is outside the intended 
reach of the relevant taxing provision since the donor's death is no 
longer of pivotal significance. The manner in which the section is written, 
however, requires analysis from the viewpoint c E the donor.21 This 
being so, the persuasiveness of the principal decision rests on finding a 
meaningful difference between the instant case and that of an irrevocable 
trust with life interest retained. The latter appears clearly within the 
purview of section 2036 even though the remainder beneficiaries may, 
absent express disabling restraints, alienate their interests prior to the 
transferor's death.22 Such a difference may lie in the fact that to decedent 
the contracts were distinct since they served separate purposes and, as 
17 Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945). The case involved an insurance-
annuity combination where the donor-"insured" retained a contingent reversionary in. 
terest in the entire proceeds of both contracts but gave the donee-beneficiary the power 
to cut off this interest at any time. However, as the donee did not do this the Court 
held that as a matter of objective fact the transfer was not finally effectuated until the 
donor's death. 
1s 281 U.S. 238 (1930). 
19 See 74 CoNG. REc. 77199 (1931); H. Rep. 1412, 81st Cong, 1st sess. (1949). 
20 If the donees held this right as beneficiaries its effective exercise would have been 
contingent on the children surviving the decedent. See principal case, appellate court 
opinion at 692, note 5 supra. In this situation, which has not been present in similar 
cases, the better view would clearly appear to be that of upholding the tax since the 
effective enjoyment would necessarily have been postponed until the donor's death. 
21 That is, the ultimate question in each case is not what the donee can or cannot 
do but what, if anything, the donor has retained. After promulgation of the predecessor 
of §2036, the Court reversed May v. Heiner, note 18 supra, in Commissioner v. Estate 
of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). This decision, with others such as Goldstone v. United 
States, note 17 supra, and Helvering v. Hallock, note 10 supra, shows the Court, un-
doubtedly influenced ·by the passage of what is now §2036, coming to interpret the 
"take effect at death" clause also from the viewpoint of the donor. 
22 There is in fact a greater likelihood that an indefeasible remainder interest in a 
trust would be prematurely conveyed than that an insurance policy of comparable face 
value would be surrendered since the discounted value of the former interest almost 
always exceeds the cash surrender value of the latter. -
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noted _in the opinion, were independently assigI_1able with the possibility 
that the insurance could hav~ been surrendered_ without affecting tp.e 
annuity. As opposed to the trust situation, the donor from her view-
point did not retain any interest in that which sh~ transferred. And the 
fact that the relationship upon which the government's position rests 
was created not at her instance but at that of the company, and for a 
purpose not directly relevant to the issue under consideration, would 
indicate that the Court was correct in accepting the viewpoint of the 
donor in this case.28 The decision, then, conforms with those in the 
"private annuity" cases and on the whole appears desirable, at least 
when viewed in the comparatively narrow context of the fact situation 
actually involved. But when considered in relation to the overall backdrop 
of section 2036, it becomes apparent that the Court has given to insurance 
companies a device which, if effectively exploited, can virtually emasculate 
that section of the code. 
John B. Schwemm, S.Ed. 
23 As previously indicated, §2036 views the ultimate question of taxability in terms 
of the donor rather than the donee. But the principal case involved the additional, 
initial question of what "property" was transferred. The determination of this question 
depends largely on whether the original transaction is viewed from the standpoint of 
the donor or that of the insurance company, and it would appear unwarranted to rely 
solely on the structure of §2036 for this answer. 
